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Despite tremendous and increasing clinical opportunities for cure and comfort, patients often still 
feel dissatisfied in their relationship with their doctor.  That patient dissatisfaction has endured, 
even in the face of increasing medical knowledge and capacity, suggests a failing not in the 
quality of medical treatment but in the way it is administered.  Increasingly, the modern medical 
movement toward patient-centered medical care (and away from doctor-centered care) has 
attempted to address this failing, looking to patient-satisfaction as one of its primary measures of 
success in these efforts.  However, its willingness to overlook the importance of the basis of 
reported satisfaction, belies its deeper, if unconscious, aim: to allow doctor and patient to avoid 
confronting deep-seeded ambivalence that each feels towards the other, inherent in their 
relationship.  The opposing urges constitutive of this ambivalence threaten to reverse physicians’ 
hard-won, positive self-concept, anchored in their sense of beneficence.  Faced with this threat, 
physicians often flee to the seemingly safer psychological territory of strict adherence to 
professional norms.  But far from finding safety in these norms, many physicians feel failed by 
them and their promise of protection from the harms of deep involvement with patient turmoil.  
Thus unprotected, physicians often breach these norms in effort to protect themselves.  This loss 
of standing with their sense of professional commitment, however, leaves them feeling further 
betrayed, now by themselves.  Caught between a loss of protection and a loss of standing, doctors 
often feel disaffected and deeply embattled, as do the patients who bear this outcome.  Unable to 
sustain these complex feelings, doctors often engage the problems of patient care in ways that 
promise to conceal these feelings.  The false premise of this engagement, however, undermines 
physician authenticity and disables patient-centered care.  How then can the doctor be restored to 
the feeling of authenticity he/she needs to stay with his/her patients in the midst of the 
tremendous and tremendously evocative ambivalence posed by serious illness?  If physicians are 
unaware of the negative counter-transference that is activated in such evocative circumstances, 
they will be unaware of the danger that the treatment plans they pursue aim at least as much at 
self-protection as at patient care.  This is the loss of patient-centeredness wrought by physician 
inauthenticity.  Thus, this thesis contends that the deeply ambivalent feelings that commonly 
trouble physicians, far from requiring suppression, ought to have a role in the care of the patients 
they are thought to threaten, if the doctors who have them are to be restored to themselves and so, 
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Despite tremendous and increasing clinical opportunities for cure and comfort, patients 
often still feel unknown and dissatisfied in their relationship with their doctor.  That patient 
dissatisfaction has endured, even in the face of increasing medical knowledge and capacity, 
suggests a failing not in the quality of medical treatment but in the way it is administered.  
Disentangling the many roots of this dissatisfaction is a complex task.  In The Silent World of 
Doctor and Patient, Jay Katz examines the substantial contribution that psychological forces 
make to that complexity, “The complexities inherent in the practice of medicine, in the 
conflicting motivations that physicians bring to their interactions with patients, and in the 
conflicting needs that patients bring to their interactions with physicians defy...simplistic notions” 
(1 p.229).  
Comments like this one are part of an enormous literature pertaining to the paradigm shift 
still underway in modern medicine from doctor-centered medical care to patient-centered care.  
The history of this metamorphosis is also complex, but it essentially rests on the medical 
establishment’s collective decision to recognize an earlier well-intentioned but wrong-headed and 
often ill-fated culture of medical care that was driven by physicians’ unquestioned expert 
estimation of patient illness and presumed altruism devoted to upholding patient well-being.  The 
movement away from this paternalism began with the prioritization of a variety of principles that 
are now viewed as bedrock values of the field: informed consent, full disclosure, confidentiality, 
and patient autonomy.   
More recently, this movement has recognized the way that the macro-culture of medicine 
is shaped by the micro-culture that exists between a single doctor and his/her patient.  Patient-
centered care, as it is currently conceived in the literature and medical education, is concerned as 
much with the way things are said between doctor and patient (i.e., which words or tone to choose 
to create a certain emotional effect worth establishing) as with why they ought to be said (i.e., in 
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the fulfillment of which principles).  The shift from doctor- to patient-centered care has been 
formalized, awkwardly so some have argued, in a variety of medically-mainstream algorithms 
and injunctions intended to ensure the priority of the patient’s personhood: 6 steps to 
communicating distressing news to a patient (2), how to use phrases like “uh-huh, go on” and 
“tell me more” to ensure proper solicitation of a patient-centered history, how to use the 5 A’s 
(assess, advise, agree, assist, arrange) to help patients take better care of themselves, how to 
NURS patients’ emotions (Name, Understand, Respect, Support) (3).  Despite how simplistic 
such techniques may appear, many physicians have benefited from their support, and important 
improvements in patient health outcome and satisfaction with doctors’ care have been 
documented.  In fact, according to the 2006 National Healthcare Quality Report, the percentage 
of patients reporting poor communication with their doctors has decreased to less than 10% this 
year (4).    
The data is heavily conflicting, though, and many studies report that the opposite is true: 
doctor-patient communication is worsening (5).  Looking into the determinants of patient 
satisfaction with their relationship with their doctor reveals many intriguing details.  Consider the 
finding that increased patient satisfaction is correlated with negative physician affect (6).  Or that 
patient assertiveness is correlated with decreased patient satisfaction (7).  Or that anxiety and 
depression attributed to hospitalization is correlated with increased patient satisfaction (8).  
Together with the vastly conflicting data, details like these force at least this question: what is the 
basis for a sense of satisfaction? What are the roots of such unobvious determinants of patient 
satisfaction as negative doctor affect?  The answer to these questions may be particularly 
instructive in our efforts to repair the inadequacies of the modern doctor-patient relationship.  The 
discovery of that answer is the primary concern of thesis. 
 
2. The problem with the standard of patient-satisfaction in patient-centered care 
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Before proposing an answer, the complexity and pervasiveness of conflicting and 
counterintuitive findings is worth beholding.  In many studies, patient satisfaction has been linked 
to the provision of adequate information by the physician (9).  However, other studies have 
shown that what is gleaned from this information is tremendously variable, calling into question 
what is meant by ‘adequate information.’  In a study comparing what patients perceived was told 
to them by their oncologist and what the oncologist perceived he/she had told the patient, a very 
surprising finding resulted:  only approximately 60% of the patients whom doctors reported had 
been informed of their cancer diagnosis, agreed that they had been so informed (10).  As the 
study explains, “It could, of course, be said that this finding relates to a common mechanism of 
denial in the patients.  However, less than 50% who were told they were free of cancer agreed 
they had been so informed.”  Thus, while patients seem to derive satisfaction from receiving 
information, it is difficult to determine what information is being given to them and how it is 
being received.  One study investigated this conundrum by evaluating patient satisfaction when 
doctors attempted to meet a patient’s explicit request for certain forms of information (diagnosis, 
prognosis, etiology, treatment, social effects of illness).  But, at least according to this study, 
patients whose doctors correctly assessed the kind of information they wanted reported no 
increase in satisfaction compared with patients whose doctors incorrectly judged their 
information needs (11).  Thus, the enigmatic circle of data proceeds in this way: patients are 
increasingly satisfied when they receive the information they want, but that information cannot be 
reliably supplied, and even when adequate information is approximately well supplied, patients 
do not report increased satisfaction.  Comprehending the meaning of data like this—especially in 
light of the many substantial variables that makes every study unique (not to mention the 
uniqueness of each living contributor to each datapoint within a study) and threaten the 
generalizability of every study’s findings—can be maddening.   
Indeed, sifting through contradictory data is one of the defining challenges of 
understanding the literature on patient satisfaction.  The following examples illustrate this 
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challenge.  In one study, patient demographics is reported to have little bearing on patient 
satisfaction with their general practitioner (12); in another study, patient demographics are 
reported to have near total bearing on patient satisfaction (13).  In particular, female gender is 
reported variably to correlate with patient satisfaction, as is socioeconomic status (14, 15).  Some 
studies report patient satisfaction is correlated more tightly with the doctor’s capacity to 
communicate well and give support than with the doctor’s technical expertise (16, 17); other 
studies report the opposite (18).  Some articles attempt to focus on the microelements of the 
doctor-patient encounter and discover degrees of satisfaction generated in each of these micro-
moments, but the attention to these details fails to penetrate the conflicting data.  One study, for 
example, recorded a series of doctor-patient encounters and coded each verbal event (even 
laughter, sighs, expletives, fragments of speech, tone, etc.) according to who said it, when it was 
said in the course of the appointment, and the category within a pre-established taxonomy it 
represented in order to analyze specific moments within a specific doctor-patient interaction.  
Findings showed that, in the course of describing one’s history of present illness to a physician, 
patients report increased satisfaction when they have the opportunity to clarify, confirm, or repeat 
information to their doctor (19).  They are also increasingly satisfied by the opportunity to give 
“non-lexical utterances (‘mm-hm’) or countless [lexical] utterances (‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘hello’).”  But 
time used to talk with a patient about his/her history has been variably correlated with patient 
(dis)satisfaction.  Data describing how doctor and patient questioning is related to patient 
satisfaction is also conflicting.  While patients’ requests for medications early in a doctor’s 
appointment has been correlated with increased patient satisfaction, requests made later in the 
appointment is correlated with decreased satisfaction (7).  Not only are the data inconsistent, but 
seemingly every moment in a clinical encounter can be captured as an opportunity to garner 
satisfaction.  For two agents, doctor and patient, hungry for satisfaction when confronting the 
possibility of illness and all the turmoil that illness signifies, the view that each moment in the 
course of an encounter can be mined for opportunities to win satisfaction must certainly be 
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attractive.  But what underlies this hunger for satisfaction?  What is at stake in research that 
functions by means of this hunger without awareness of it or its basis?  These questions are 
critical for reasons that will be addressed later in this section.  For now, however, in the previous 
study, regarding the request for medications, while researchers admit that the dizzying number of 
findings should really be used to generate broader hypotheses about patient satisfaction, they 
nevertheless suggest that “physicians may find it useful to make an opportunity in the encounter 
process for patients to request medications at a relatively early stage.  The timing of this patient 
behavior appeared to be critical to subsequent patient satisfaction with the encounter.”  This 
suggestion is stunning for the commitment to mining for opportunities that it reflects.  
Contemplating the incorporation of innumerable similar suggestions into the average clinical 
encounter is exhausting, but more importantly, it misses the point that satisfaction is not 
something to seek in itself, but something that should result authentically and inadvertently from 
a deep pursuit of patient understanding.  So distressing is the possibility of patient dissatisfaction 
that one study, looking at family satisfaction in the ICU setting when faced with decisions about 
withdrawal of life support, states that “limiting conflict…[is] morally imperative” (20).  The 
concern for satisfaction in such treacherous settings as the ICU is of course, understandable.  But 
the concern this paper has is with the possibility that the pursuit of satisfaction, the moral 
imperative to avoid conflict wherever possible in pursuit of satisfaction, will have deeper patient 
(or patient family) concerns, hopes, fears, and feelings go totally unnoticed—and ultimately 
unhonored.  As this paper will explore in greater detail later, certain key feelings come out only in 
conflict.  If that conflict is not received and managed well, then no therapeutic value will be 
derived from the discovery of the feeling, and in fact harm may be done.  The problem there, 
though, is not with the eruption of conflict, but with its poor management and the harm that 
usually results.  The “moral imperative” is to limit the harm, not the conflict.  In fact, if conflict is 
managed well, the partnership between doctor and patient can be deepened immensely and the 
acknowledgement of patient’s personhood can be nothing short of profound.  Avoiding conflict 
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sells out on this potential.  The work in pursuit of satisfaction never arrives at these depths and 
can never deliver an outcome as important.  As this paper will argue, it also betrays the 
fundamental aims of patient-centered care.  
To understand the problems of pursuing patient satisfaction as a way of realizing the goal 
of patient-centered medicine, it is useful to explore the relationship between patients’ satisfaction 
and doctors’, as well.  How much does doctor satisfaction with their patient interactions and 
treatment outcomes hinge on patient satisfaction, despite the possibility of its distorted basis?  
Some studies have found tight correlations, going so far as to propose arithmetic equations that 
describe how doctors and patients can experience a mutually satisfying clinical encounter: 
Encounter Satisfaction = Acknowledgement + Anticipation + Experience + Expectation + 
Explanation (ES = 2A + 3Ex), (21).  A less abstract description of this correlation is offered in a 
recent study by the Brigham and Women’s Hospital, reporting that patients of doctors who 
describe themselves as extremely satisfied professionally tend to be more satisfied with their 
overall healthcare than patients of less satisfied doctors (15).  Another study, from a collaboration 
between Oregon Health Sciences University, Portland State University, New York University, 
Cincinnati Children’s Hospital, and the Robert Graham Center for Policy Studies in Family 
Medicine and Primary Care in Washington, D.C., looked at a range of variables associated with 
doctor and patient satisfaction.  The two variables most tightly correlated were physician overall 
career satisfaction and their patients’ satisfaction with overall healthcare (22).  The measured 
variables were substantial and pertained to several well-known elements of a satisfying doctor-
patient relationship: physician sense of clinical decision-making freedom, the ability to provide 
high quality care, being able to avoid sacrificing income in the pursuit of high quality care, 
patient satisfaction with their choice of physician, and patient trust that their doctor prioritizes 
quality care-giving over everything else.  One might have reasonably predicted that the tightest 
correlation would occur between the physician’s sense that he/she is able to deliver high quality 
care and the patient’s sense that he/she chose the right physician, but this is not reflected in the 
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data.  The data shows that the tightest correlation is between two much less well-carved out 
variables, two senses of “overall satisfaction.”  What is to be made of this correlation between 
such sweeping forms of satisfaction?  The concern this paper has is in the possibility that much 
lives in the vagaries of this correlation.  Even if one form of satisfaction is not causally linked to 
the other, the linkage is significant: there is a cycle of mutually reinforcing satisfaction between 
doctor and patient that just as well could spin in the direction of dissatisfaction.  One important 
claim this paper is committed to is that the medical community should be careful not to lose itself 
in the work of pushing the cycle in one direction over the other, but instead devote itself to 
understanding the basis of the linkage; without that understanding, even if a cycle of mutually 
reinforcing satisfaction could be set in motion, it is possible that the basis for a given doctor’s or 
patient’s satisfaction is distorted, a psychological injury seeking alleviation as expeditiously as 
possible, even if that means inadequate longterm redress, even it if comes at the expense of 
important values in appropriate medical care.  If the deeper basis for one’s sense of satisfaction is 
relief from injury or distress, thirsty pursuit of satisfaction may conceal a cycle of reinjury that, 
once in place, can create cyclical opportunities for alleviation that may be read as satisfaction, but 
hardly a form of satisfaction most would want to encourage (i.e., one that depends on continual 
reinjury).   
Despite all this conflicting and counterintuitive data, studies pertaining to patient 
satisfaction continue, of course.  Beyond the aim of ensuring patient-centered care, there are 
many reasons why satisfaction has become such a focus of research.  Many studies have shown 
that patient satisfaction is correlated with patient compliance with treatment and loyalty to a 
particular care provider (23).  Other studies cite the relationship between increased patient 
satisfaction and decreased malpractice claims; in one study, inpatient physicians whose patients 
were least satisfied with their performance had malpractice rates 110% higher than physicians 
whose patients were most satisfied (24).  Ensuring patient satisfaction, therefore, has been 
promoted as a strategy to minimize the number of malpractice lawsuits.  Marketing companies 
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have commodified patient satisfaction, studying which emotions experienced by patients 
contribute most to the feeling of satisfaction and what can be done to urge the surfacing of those 
patient emotions that are positively correlated with satisfaction and doing so during the moments 
when satisfaction is most sensitive to the influence of those emotions (8).  Of course, these other 
uses for data on patient satisfaction do not, in themselves, make research on patient satisfaction 
altogether wrong (though, to be sure, its transparency is threatened); they do, however, highlight 
the ways in which the pursuit of patient satisfaction casts the patient as an object of manipulation, 
used by business to secure profitability or by doctors to derive a sense of beneficence or relief 
from guilt. 
The central thesis of this paper, then, is that patient satisfaction is the wrong standard for 
determining the success of patient-centered medical care: it is dangerous, casts the patient as an 
object by means of which a standard of care is achieved, and ultimately it abandons the patient to 
struggle alone with his relentlessly competing desires for satisfaction.  Indeed, these competing 
desires may well explain why data regarding patient satisfaction is so rife with contradictions and 
inconsistencies:  because this deep-seated psychological ambivalence lives inside of each of us, 
even when one is asked to declare him/herself decisively as satisfied or dissatisfied.  Lived 
experience, it is well-known, is more complicated than these simple statements of satisfaction 
suggest: important forms of patient dissatisfaction (e.g., disappointment, resentment and fear) are 
alive even in seemingly manifest satisfaction, just as important forms of satisfaction (e.g., a sense 
of importance, relief from guilt, discharge of anger at succumbing to illness, feeling alive) live 
inside of manifest dissatisfaction.  This complexity may never be eliminated, much as we may 
wish it would for the purposes of giving cleaner study results.  Satisfaction may, ultimately, be 
impossible to assess in any meaningful way because it is the basis of satisfaction that determines 
its meaning, and the basis of satisfaction is not attended to by ordinary research tools.  Of course 
a more superficial assessment of patient satisfaction can be made, but it does not signify what 
most physicians hope it would—namely that the patient’s unique humanity has actually been 
 9
noticed and our respect for its struggle with ambivalence is as deep as for our own.  The 
accomplishment of noticing and respecting is vulnerable to self-generous, simplistic estimations 
made by physicians hungry for approval and habituated to converting things as complicated as 
acquiring informed consent into a checklist of tasks.  But to carry out care that is authentically 
patient-centered, physicians need to let go of the self-soothing, comfortably concrete work of 
discovering the correlates of patient satisfaction, and take up a much more complex task, which 
begins with accepting the profundity and inescapability of our pervasive internal ambivalence.  
 
3. From self-deception to self-honesty: exploring the basis for satisfaction 
 
What is our struggle with ambivalence?  How can it be described?  Anna Freud, in an 
address to the entering class of Western Reserve Medical School, in 1964, described at least one 
form of it that physicians harbor in this way:  
In every nursery school, the nursery school teacher is prepared that in some corner of the 
room, or of the garden if there is one, a hospital will be established, and this hospital will 
be usually for insects, frogs or lizards or any other small animals that can be found.  And 
these small animals will be tended carefully in boxes, fed and looked after and, as the 
child says, cured.  Sometimes, especially when it is an insect, legs will be pulled off 
beforehand so that a patient is produced, and the patient is cured afterwards.  Which 
means that the child’s wish to help and to cure is still very close to the wish to hurt and to 
maim.  The younger the child, the stronger his wish to hurt.  The older and more socially 
adapted he becomes, the more this aggressive wish can be submerged under a strong urge 
to help.  Both wishes can lead the growing individual straight into medicine.  Naturally, 
no need for the doctor anymore to provide his own patients by harming them.  Fate does 
that for him.  He only needs to cure them.  But the wish to deal with those who are hurt, 
in pain, maimed has to be there, and probably always underlies, even though hidden in 
the unconscious, the wish to cure and to help (25 p.643).  
 
This statement is particularly interesting to consider in the context of the previously mentioned 
findings that show a tight linkage between doctor- and patient-satisfaction.  Recall that, in the 
study from Oregon Health Sciences University, Portland State University, New York University, 
Cincinnati Children’s Hospital, and the Robert Graham Center for Policy Studies in Family 
Medicine and Primary Care in Washington, D.C., the tightest correlation among measured 
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variables was between physician overall career satisfaction and their patients’ satisfaction with 
overall healthcare.  Recall that more tightly contoured variables were measured, but it was 
between the two most loosely fitting ones that the tightest correlation was found.  The primary 
concern this paper raised pertained to all that can be hidden in terms (like “overall satisfaction”) 
that summarize too much.  The preoccupation with drawing on the power of the linkage between 
doctor- and patient-satisfaction, without regard to the source of their satisfaction, in order to 
advance the spread of satisfaction from doctor to patient and back again, while appealing, is also 
dangerous because it is the basis of satisfaction that determines the value of achieving it, and that 
is unexamined in these studies.  Without understanding the basis for the satisfaction measured, 
drawing on the linkage between doctor- and patient-satisfaction can inadvertently (at least 
consciously so) exploit a psychological deficit, injury, or even an innate malevolence in either 
party.  It is here that this statement by Anna Freud becomes particularly illuminating: it speaks to 
one form of what may be called innate malevolence—the desire to hurt and to maim.  As Anna 
Freud explains, it starts in the earliest moments of life and, particularly in those earliest moments, 
may as likely be directed toward oneself as toward another.  “There is, in the beginning,” as she 
says earlier in this same speech, “even no barrier to self-injury and the baby would draw blood 
from his face if the mother did not see to the cutting of his nails.  What we call the pain barrier is 
established gradually during the first year and the child’s aggression deflected with it from is own 
body to the outside world” (25 p.636).  With age, she says, these desires become buried beneath 
an obviously more socially acceptable urge to help, but as with biological development, in 
psychological development also primordial origins shape, limit, and continue to inhabit mature 
ones.  At the very least, then, by virtue of their shared origin, the urge to help and to cure is 
inseparable from the urge to hurt and to maim; the wish to hurt may be—and hopefully is—
subdued,* but never eliminated.  Acknowledging this wish, that it continues to live into our 
                                                 
* “Subdued” is critically different from “submerged,” the word Ana Freud actually uses. “Subdued” suggests that one is 
conscious of its existence, thus not inclined to expend vital energy in its denial, thus reserving vital energy for its well-
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maturity, and furthermore that it does so even inside an urge to do the exact opposite—to help 
and to cure—is critical.  Without this acknowledgment, we disable our capacity to detect when 
satisfaction is derived from the gratification of one of these urges versus the other—a dangerous 
disability.  Appreciating the importance of this capacity is totally missed in measures of overall 
satisfaction.  Though not consciously experienced as satisfying, maybe fulfillment of the desire to 
harm is part of what underlies the willingness of a doctor to prescribe a medication of 
questionable necessity, for example, or forgo a treatment that seems important.  Anna Freud’s 
comments here point to the uncomfortable fact that key forms of satisfaction live inside even 
those experiences that many would describe as decidedly dissatisfying.  Of course, there may be 
many other reasons a doctor might prescribe a not-totally-necessary medication or forgo a 
treatment, but it is of special importance to recognize the potential contribution that our 
unconscious urges make to such everyday behaviors as these.  There are many examples of urges 
that yield deep satisfaction unacknowledged in consciousness, and that are in fact consciously 
experienced as dissatisfaction.  Consider the patient who arrives at the emergency room, agitated 
and combative.  The resident assesses that the patient is either intoxicated or withdrawing from an 
addiction.  His combativeness continues, and the resident becomes overwhelmed and frustrated 
with the persistent disruption, interference, even assaultive behavior.  In his frustration, he 
decides, rather than to admit him, to have him arrested.  Here the all-too-conscious urge to punish 
coincides with the possibility of the patient’s desire to be punished.  This is to say that maybe the 
patient’s behavior in the emergency room is just the most recent permutation of a lifetime of 
turmoil that in fact is sustained by the patient’s sense that he deserves only turmoil.  Maybe the 
patient uses the turmoil to relieve himself of the guilt he feels for failing his own or others’ 
expectation for himself, accepting—even seeking—punishment.  This relief from guilt by means 
of self-punishment is repeatedly fulfilled by his addiction.  The inadequacy of this redress—
addiction, while certainly punishing, never adequately quenches his thirst for punishment and, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
management.  “Submerged” suggests the opposite. 
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fact, often deepens it—is not incidental, driving a continual renewal of opportunity to self-punish 
and relieve.  Here is the cycle of reinjury that the unconscious doctor advances when he decides 
to arrest the patient for his assaultive misbehavior.  The force of the doctor’s contribution to this 
injurious dynamic is reinforced by the work it takes for him to overcome the urge to discharge the 
way the patient seems to allow himself.  Maybe the decision to arrest instead of admit is the 
doctor’s attempt to reach for a more socially acceptable, if problematic, form of striking back at 
the patient for his misbehavior and halting the patient’s indulgence of an urge that the doctor 
shares with him (i.e., the urge to assault).  The target of the urge is different (for the doctor, the 
target is a frustrating, even dangerous, patient; for the patient, it is the authorities that, if 
provoked, will enable him to regain relief through the punishment they administer) but the urge is 
similar.  The urge to be punished provokes and meets the urge to punish, though neither is 
consciously acknowledged; in fact, far more likely, both are consciously, emphatically, and 
understandably denied.  At the level of conscious awareness, dissatisfaction prevails: the patient 
does not enjoy being arrested, and the doctor does not enjoy having his patient be arrested.  In 
fact, consciously, both wish for the opposite.  These conscious feelings are real, but their reality 
serves to protect both of them from recognizing what they would regard as too ugly an 
underworld of urges to tolerate its contribution to their self-concept.  These examples are coarsely 
described here, but they illustrate the point that the conscious experience of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction is not as easy to read as one might hope.  
The urge to help may sound more innocent than the urge to harm, but unless it coincides 
with a need to help, its fulfillment may be just as dangerous.  Consider, for example, when the 
doctor’s urge to help matches up with the patient’s urge to be helped, even in the absence of any 
such need.  Examples of this dangerous matching are common.  One such example is the 
pervasive practice of prescribing antibiotics to patients who often have viral infections.  Here, the 
urge to help and the urge to be helped motivate a harmful encounter that is experienced as 
anything but; despite whatever misgivings physicians may have, mutual satisfaction usually 
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prevails.  The key point here is that while satisfaction may indeed be the prevailing feeling, 
mutual exploitation and injury may be the avenue to it.  
These examples illustrate how no form of satisfaction is pure, and this is so because the 
basis for it is so complex and mired in opposing urges.  Conscious dissatisfaction can disguise 
and make tolerable important but uglier forms of satisfaction that we would rather not admit.  
Conscious satisfaction can be derived from experiences that sustain injurious cycles that are 
ignored in the thirsty pursuit of mutual satisfaction.  Equally possible, conscious satisfaction can 
be used to enable the submergence of deeper forms of dissatisfaction, a less pleasant feeling that 
threatens to create a less pleasant self-concept.  Consider the example of a very pleasant but sick 
patient who readily accepts his doctor’s diagnosis and advice and quickly offers summaries of his 
feelings that seem totally reasonable, even admirable, to the doctor listening to him.  On the 
surface, the patient appears mature, capable, maybe even noble.  The physician may feel gratified, 
relieved, present, maybe humbled.  These feelings are real, and in that moment they are powerful.  
However, it is in the basis of these feelings where the story lies.  One possible scenario might be 
that the patient wants to make his doctor feel good in order to relieve him of the burden of the 
guilt he may feel that comes from knowing, on some level, that he enjoys the fact that he has been 
spared his patient’s fate.  The patient wants to relieve his doctor of this guilt because he needs his 
doctor desperately.  Knowing that the doctor does not share his fate and that the doctor has many 
other patients who compete for his limited resources, the patient knows that his hold on the 
doctor’s attention is fragile, that his doctor’s attention is supplied voluntarily and as such may 
also be withdrawn.  This fragility is made more fragile still by the patient’s competing (usually 
unconscious) urge to reject the doctor’s help; the patient’s dire circumstance permits the doctor 
the opportunity to indulge a taste of self-aggrandizing devotion, which the patient resents and 
mistrusts but tolerates in order to gain the much-needed benefits of the devotion.  The power of 
the connection that the doctor feels with his patient, as he listens to the patient generously 
summarize his feelings about his diagnosis, is fueled as much by relief that the patient is not 
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consciously holding him accountable for his failed health as by the doctor’s energetic 
submergence of guilt for his feelings of relief that he does not share his patient’s fate.  There are 
other more positive aspects of the powerful connection doctor and patient feel toward one 
another, but these deeper, less pleasant feelings are often ignored (i.e., submerged) because they 
threaten the stability of a positive self-concept.  For many obvious reasons, the doctor does not 
want to think of himself as self-aggrandizing, using the patient’s misfortune to emphasize his 
relative safety; neither does the patient want to experience himself as a cumbersome, resentful 
object, used by the doctor to sustain his view of himself and fated to die alone.  The surface of the 
doctor-patient interaction here is placid, but understanding what lives beneath the surface 
illuminates the superficiality enabling the simple feeling of mutual satisfaction, and in doing so, 
questions its relevance in patient-centered care. 
There are innumerable sources of ambivalence underlying the doctor-patient relationship, 
and, this thesis claims, each undermines the relevance of patient-satisfaction as a measure of 
patient-centered care.  One form of ambivalence deserves specific mention here, given its 
prominence in the experience of being a patient and, because of that, how powerfully it questions 
the relevance of measuring patient-satisfaction: the desire to be spared.  Before exploring the 
ambivalence that inheres in this desire, an exploration of the context for its emergence is useful.  
Even in the most ordinary of doctor-patient encounters, routine check ups, etc., it hardly bears 
mentioning that patients feel anxious about having to be examined by a doctor.  While many 
patients acknowledge their anxiety, the roots of this anxiety often lie beneath the level of their 
conscious awareness and as such are experienced only dimly and often in disguise: as the tension 
a patient feels in the doctor’s waiting room or in his hospital bed or as his inability to comply 
with a medication regimen or as his tendency to postpone a needed appointment and so on.  
Whatever concrete reasons he may be able to cite for these feelings and tendencies, none of them 
captures the fullness of the anxiety that accompanies them.  Still, the apparent legitimacy of these 
rationales obscures their superficiality and constitutes a powerful surface tension that overlies and 
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protects the patient’s deeper feelings from exposure to the destabilizing forces of open analysis.  
To breach that surface tension and gain access to some measure of these depths, consider the 
following (if speculative) thought exercise: a patient arrives at his doctor’s office to discuss the 
result of his recent blood test.  Maybe his mindset on arrival is that the news will be good—he 
feels well and is optimistic; or, maybe he senses bad news, regretting certain high-risk behaviors 
he has exercised in the past, for example, or remembering the number of close family members 
who suffer from a particular ailment, which contributes to a sense he has of being predisposed.  It 
is also common that positive and negative mindsets, alike, work as a function of superstition to 
guard against bad news or as a psychological safeguard against the possibility of unexpected bad 
news.  However unaware of these strategies he may be, each of them is built to answer the 
challenge posed by two more deeply-situated and captivating possibilities: that he is mortally sick 
or that he has managed to evade mortal sickness.  This latter possibility preserves for the patient 
the hope that there has been a special exception made to the universality of the fantasy of 
personal indestructibility**: that in his particular case, he really is indestructible, that for him this 
is no fantasy, and that he will, therefore, continue to avoid debility (including the gravest debility 
of all, death).  On a conscious level, of course, the patient may deny this hope, viewing it as 
childish, and understands that he may indeed be sick.  But consciousness is no safer territory to 
explore than unconsciousness, particularly when it is given to contemplating the possibility of 
illness.  To attend to the conscious anxiety that he may be sick, the patient chooses to rely on his 
doctor, an uncomfortable decision considering the force of his countervailing (though usually 
unconscious) hope regarding his exceptionality.  Having so chosen, however, he must be 
bewildered by the tests his doctor deems necessary.  Even if the doctor explains the rationale for 
these tests, the patient must face the bizarre reality that his fate will become evident through the 
reading of microscopic, alien entities, like blood cell counts and tumor markers.  He must also 
                                                 
** “…at bottom no one believes in his own death, or, to put the same thing in another way that in the unconscious every 
one of us is convinced of his immortality.”  From Freud S, “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” 14 Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), p 289. 
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face the reality that he, himself, cannot decipher the meaning of these markers.  This emphasizes 
his reliance on his doctor, and it can easily foster a sense in the patient that his doctor is endowed 
with special powers—to decode obscure data; to derive meaning from numbers, words and 
images that to the patient are meaningless; to restore orientation to the patient otherwise lost to 
disorientation.  Witnessing the doctor’s comfort with awkward, seemingly magical markers of 
wellness, the patient must wonder, however unconsciously, ‘How can it be that I have been exiled 
so from matters of my own wellness?  How can so much within and about me be so invisible to 
me, and so readily visible to someone else?’  These questions must gain special force in light of 
the awful fact, however unacknowledged, that one’s sense of feeling well may stem from, in fact, 
being well or from being merely asymptomatic but in fact quite sick.  On some level, the patient 
must realize his incapacity to distinguish between these two possibilities, which only emphasizes 
further his reliance on the doctor to do so for him.  The patient thus arrives at the doctor’s office 
full of this incredulous, reluctant, hopeful (i.e., psychologically saturated) acceptance of his 
dependence on his doctor, and it is out of this context that the desire to be spared and the 
ambivalence contained therein can begin to be understood.  
However extreme (and so, unlikely) the anxiety in this desire may appear, its existence is 
quickly discovered in the patient’s stated interests.  What he usually wants to know from his 
doctor is plainly if he is sick and, if so, how sick.  But what happens when the doctor answers 
these questions?  When the doctor informs him that he is indeed sick and seriously so, has the 
patient’s question really been answered—or has the anxiety underlying the question merely been 
laid bare?  If, on the other hand, the doctor informs the patient that he is well, again it seems too 
simple, if superficially accurate, to assess merely that the patient’s question has been answered.  
The pronounced relief, the momentarily profound feeling of wellness, that most patients feel in 
being so informed belies what was at stake for them when they first posed the question (if only to 
themselves).  An answer, regardless of its content, seems to trigger so many more and deeper 
feelings in the patient than merely that of being informed that one wonders if his stated question 
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really seeks only the information that it claims to seek.  The possibility that there is something 
more that interests the patient, beyond the explicit claims of his question, gives hint of his 
underlying anxiety.  This is not to say that his stated question is somehow wrong; it is of course 
an important question with an important answer.  But its formulation seems to search for an 
answer that would collude with its unstated (unconscious) interest in reshaping the encounter 
between doctor and patient from one of existential implications to one merely about information, 
data, and statistics.  Therefore, little of the discussion about such information, data, and statistics 
addresses the patient’s deeper anxiety, but this anxiety finds expression, nevertheless, in the 
patient’s persistent concerns; he wonders if the data is real or mistaken, if the information is fixed 
or available to interpretation, if the more likely or less likely side of a given statistic applies to 
him (e.g., if 1 in 5 patients do well with a given treatment, this particular patient certainly 
identifies more with the ‘1’ or the ‘5’.), if his place in the cited statistics would change if his care 
were managed by a different (i.e., better) doctor.  These uncertainties are common and interest in 
addressing them is understandable, but their basis is far deeper than discussion aimed at 
answering them suggests.  The problem the patient faces, ultimately, is not just that these 
questions lack simple answers, but that their answers are often conflicting and disappointing.  
Consider the desire to spared, which this thesis contends is the basis for the anxiety that these 
uncertainties reflect, the basis for the other feelings that accumulate around the answer to the 
question about whether or not he is sick.  The patient arrives at the doctor’s office wondering if 
he will be spared, but the existential challenge posed by this question is overwhelming and 
disorganizing, which fosters his focus on less emotionally charged versions of this question that 
seek less emotionally charged information.  But even if the patient could allow himself to ask 
whether or not he will be spared, neither answer, yes or no, escapes deep disappointment—and 
this is the essential ambivalence of the desire; the question itself reflects the patient’s recognition 
that he may not be, that he hopes for mercy in a world that often does not grant it, that his world 
is not benign in this way, and that his sense of feeling at home in this world (however much he 
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may have worked to secure it) is thus questioned.  Interest in eliminating this disappointment and 
the fragility it produces motivates the patient to check the status of his wellness relentlessly—or 
not at all, as is the case with patients who minimize their need for health maintenance in the form 
of not scheduling or missing appointments, not adhering to medication regimens, etc.; relentlessly 
checking and refusing to check are both invested in testing the mercy of the world towards the 
patient’s desire to be spared, the former obviously so and the latter by essentially claiming that a 
truly merciful world would not require such vigilance from the frail.  Even ordinary degrees of 
concern with one’s health are defined by the abiding sense that the question of whether or not 
one’s health status is secure is never adequately answered; it is continually searching for 
reaffirmation.  So urgent is the need for reaffirmation, even patients assured of their current good 
health or of cure cannot help but wonder if the result is real, if it can be trusted (i.e., ‘sure, I’m 
okay know,’ the patient asks, ‘but how about now?  …and now?’).  An answer to the question in 
one moment fails so completely to answer the question when it spontaneously resurfaces a 
moment later that it often feels altogether irrelevant.  Revisiting the study by Mosconi et. al. 
(mentioned above), one wonders if the patients who denied being informed of their health 
status—even when they were being told that they were in good health—were trapped in this 
almost obsessive search for reaffirmation; it is not that they were unable to hear or accept the 
answer, but rather that their question resurfaced and demanded another answer—and that answer 
they were not given.** 
                                                 
** A relevant childhood correlate relates to a child playing peek-a-boo.  He derives enjoyment from the relief of 
watching the security and love, embodied in the interlocutor’s face that has apparently disappeared, be restored again 
and again each time the caregiver flings her hands open to reveal a smiling, familiar face.  With the revelation, the 
anxiety that all security and love have disappeared, leaving the child alone and vulnerable, is relieved.  The game is 
interesting to the child as long as the child never quite trusts that the face (and the security that the face embodies) 
exists when it isn’t readily visible: the relief of real tension is what drives the child’s engagement.  That the child comes 
to understand that the face is there, even when hands hide it, reflects a step in development that is critical to the child’s 
sense of internal stability.  Things that aren’t visible are still there, the feeling of being loved and supported by mother 
can endure her physical absence, the sense of self-worth that receives no explicit affirmation from the environment can 
withstand this absence.  As with the child energized by a game of peek-a-boo, adults also wonder about the durability 
of their security, particularly in matters of health (read, life or death).  And also like the child playing peek-a-boo, the 
relief that comes from being notified that a patient is still safe from harm requires constant reassurance.  
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The difficulty of living with this incredulity is easy to imagine.  But living with the 
alternative—ambivalently accepting the profound indifference that life is capable of showing, 
reflected in its ending at times that feel totally unrelated to the degree of one’s readiness to die—
is also difficult.  Preferring safety, most search for people who would save them from the work of 
making this acknowledgement and facing the despondence that flows from it.  Ernest Becker, in 
The Denial of Death, says that when we find those people, we give ourselves over to them all too 
eagerly, in a way that is related to the psychoanalytic phenomenon of transference (26 p.129).  In 
transference, the adult patient “transfers” to the doctor (in an unconscious psychological 
maneuver) attributes that he originally ascribed to his parents when he was a child in order to 
experience them as adequate protection, which, in turn, allowed him to experience himself as 
adequately protected in and from the world.  In this way, transference enables for an adult patient 
a feeling of relief from anxiety (whatever its stimulus) by distorting (in another unconscious 
psychological maneuver) the dangerousness of reality to match the wished-for protectedness of 
childhood.  Similarly, according to Becker’s summary of Freud, Ferenczi and Fenichel, when we 
meet someone, such as a doctor, who taps into what he calls our  “secret yearning” to forfeit our 
will to our parent, we do so, seeking their protection.  This yearning, he says, is what fuels our 
capacity to be hypnotized, as individuals and even as societies.  This is so, as Becker explains, 
“precisely because [we] want to get back to the magical protection, the participation in 
omnipotence, the ‘oceanic feeling’ that [we] enjoyed when [we] were loved and protected by 
[our] parents.”* Anna Freud, though, warns that the patient’s transference onto the doctor and the 
regression to child-like states that animates the transference, is more circumscribed than 
unbounded terms like “omnipotence” and “oceanic” suggest: “The patient…will do his best to 
push you [the doctor] into the place of parental authority,” she says in another portion of the 
speech quoted earlier, “and he will make use of you as parental authority to the utmost….  On the 
                                                 
* Becker p.132, citing Otto Fenichel, “Psychoanalytic Remarks from Fromm’s Book, Escape from Freedom,” 
Psychoanalytic Review, 1944, 31: 133-134. 
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other hand, you must not be tempted to treat him as a child…because he has only gone back to 
childhood so far as he’s ill.  He also has another part of his personality which has remained intact, 
and that part of him will resent it deeply, if you make too much use of your authority.”  It is 
difficult to appreciate (sometimes even to believe) the power and universality of transference (in 
one form or another) and the apparent intolerability of the anxiety that generates it.  This is the 
psychological soil of the doctor-patient encounter, however.  The question, am I okay, Doc? 
(read, will I be spared?), however inexplicitly it may be asked, is born of that same anxiety about 
the indifference and dangerousness of the world that motivates the regression to child-like states 
in the course of enacting a transference fantasy.  The part about that anxiety and about that 
question that deserves special attention is how much hope and hopelessness it holds, 
simultaneously: that the world will be a more merciful place than we know it to be.  We hope for 
something we know to be unresponsive to hope, trapped in the nonsense of that endeavor.  With 
such deep ambivalence defining the experience of being a patient, studies pertaining to patient 
satisfaction seem to collude with patients in their denial of ambivalence.  They offer, instead, an 
attractive alternative to living with the deep and often painful feelings associated with profound 
ambivalence.  But doing so reinforces patients’ transference fantasy.  Without any awareness of 
these forces, patients may indeed be the center of medical work, but they remain far from the 
center medical care. 
 
4. Ambivalence and what its recognition promises 
 
In the face of such ambivalence, the patient-centered care movement’s work to assess 
patient-satisfaction seems not just superficial, but misguided.  Satisfaction measured in any given 
moment, however genuine, measures something other than what is intended.  As the previous 
discussion explains, urges do seek gratification and when it is attained, satisfaction emerges, but 
because opposing urges coexist—a fact that forms the basis of ambivalence—the gratification of 
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one occurs only when another is denied gratification.  Our urge to be taken care of is gratified 
only as our urge to prove ourselves as self-sufficient is denied.  Our desire for the help we need is 
fulfilled only at the expense of our equally powerful desire to not need help.  One urge competes 
with another for expression and gratification.  The satisfaction we feel measures our 
unwillingness to acknowledge the denial of other urges as much as it measures anything else.  In 
particular, the opportunity to deny certain ugly urges (e.g. to hurt or to maim, as Anna Freud 
suggested, or to rage against the fact of our fragility and the dangerousness of the world we were 
born into, or to enjoy someone else’s misfortune because it means, at least relative to that 
person’s fate, that we have been spared) may contribute to the sense of satisfaction, but this 
contribution is a function of a deep personal nervousness aimed at preserving a certain fragile, 
dishonest but more pleasant self-concept, which is hardly the intention of patient-centered care 
but which is, nevertheless, reinforced in the movement’s effort to measure and maximize patient-
satisfaction.  A more truthful undertaking, acknowledgement of opposing urges and profound 
anxious ambivalence, does not permit the feeling of satisfaction.  Ambivalence is definitively 
unsatisfying.  But allowing its recognition, however unsatisfying it may be for doctor and patient 
alike, may also be orienting to them both, enabling the feeling of authenticity and self-
recognition.  This, then, is the second fundamental claim of this thesis: patient-satisfaction is an 
attractive pursuit for the patient-centered care movement, but it ultimately allows mutually 
reinforcing self-deception, injury, and alienation to flow between doctor and patient by obscuring 
the tremendous ambivalence that exists beneath the surface of the encounter.  The less 
immediately gratifying, but more honest-minded work of recognizing this pervasive and 
inescapable ambivalence, however, breaks this cycle, and enables the arrival at genuinely patient-
centered care.  The work of this recognition will be the focus of the remainder of this paper. 
 
5. Ambivalence and the call for authenticity 
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Recognizing the forms and details of ambivalence underlying the doctor-patient 
encounter requires a self-honesty that ultimately is constitutive of the experience of authenticity.  
One of the aims of this thesis is to comment on how ensuring authenticity—particularly physician 
authenticity—serves the purposes of patient-centered care far better than ensuring patient-
satisfaction.  How authenticity is achieved is a complicated matter, of course, and one route to its 
achievement will be outlined later in this paper.  For now, a brief exploration of what is meant by 
authenticity may help explain why its attainment is more worthy of attention than patient-
satisfaction.  In The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age, psychoanalyst Bruno Bettelheim 
describes a kind of autonomy that approximates authenticity such that the two concepts or 
feeling-states, while distinct, are only subtly so.  
The continuous balancing and resolving of opposing tendencies within oneself, and 
between self and society—the ability to do this in keeping with personal values, an 
enlightened self interest, and the interests of the society one lives in—all these lead to an 
increasing consciousness of freedom and form the basis for man’s deepening sense of 
identity, self-respect and inner freedom, in short his autonomy.   
 
One’s sense of identity, the conviction of being a unique individual, with lasting and 
deeply meaningful relations to a few others; with a particular life history that one has 
shaped and been shaped by; a respect for one’s work and a pleasure in one’s competence 
at it; with memories peculiar to one’s personal experience, preferred tasks, tastes, and 
pleasures—all these are at the heart of man’s autonomous existence.  Instead of merely 
allowing him to conform to the reasonable demands of society without losing his identity, 
they make it a rewarding experience, quite often a creative one (27 p.72-3). 
 
Consonant with the foundational presupposition of this paper, this statement claims that 
ambivalence—“opposing tendencies”—is the root of how we experience ourselves, and it is our 
recognition of that that allows the “continuous balancing and resolving” of these tendencies “…in 
keeping with personal values” that “form the basis for man’s deepening sense of identity, self-
respect and inner freedom.”  In this way, it appears that ambivalence prefigures authenticity.   
The language of this comment by Bettelheim is worth noting, as well.  It inhabits the 
same territory of self-experience that it describes.  The language is careful, but only in its 
exactness, not in self-consciousness.  It is without jargon, and as recognizable as its content is, it 
feels unobvious and unborrowed—important characteristics of authenticity.  These traits carry the 
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power of the statement to connect, as it does, with its reader.  As the reader senses the 
authenticity in this statement, the feeling that is generated is not so much satisfaction as 
illumination, identification, and of being addressed, recognized, even animated.  The same can be 
said of another comment of Bettelheim’s, also linking autonomy to authenticity, “autonomy…has 
little to do with what is sometimes called ‘rugged individualism’…or noisy self assertion.  It has 
to do with man’s inner ability to govern himself, and with a conscientious search for meaning 
despite the realization that, as far as we know, there is no purpose to one’s life.  It is a concept 
that does not imply a revolt against authority qua authority, but rather a quiet acting out of inner 
conviction, not out of convenience or resentment or because of external persuasion or controls.”  
Here, too, a first-order feeling, as much as thought content, is transmitted to the reader.  The 
generation of spontaneous, personally-peculiar feeling-states is, thus, the focus as much as the 
derivative of Bettelheim’s message.  So it is that he stays true to the imperative even as he 
describes it, a powerful means of underscoring the existential implications of authenticity versus 
inauthenticity. 
On a more technical level, authenticity can be thought of as that which results from the 
identification and negotiation of profound personal values.  Like Bruno Bettelheim, a recent 
article in the Journal of Philosophy of Medicine also sees the concepts of autonomy and 
authenticity as deeply related, and offers an illuminating, if more abstract, way of understanding 
the building blocks of the autonomous, authentic experience. 
Crucial for understanding the way in which our life over time acquires its structure and 
shape is the idea of an identity conferring self-conception and the concerns involved in 
such a self-conception.  An identity conferring self-conception is a description under 
which a person values himself or herself….  Each self-conception involves a set of 
concerns….  Concerns are complex wholes of cognitive, affective, and volitional 
dispositions.  They are dispositions to care in a deep sense about particular persons (e.g., 
your child), goals (e.g., becoming a respected scholar), or ideals (e.g., social justice).  
Such concerns can give structure and shape to a person’s life, as they provide reasons to 
go on living in a certain way…concerns are the source of the reasons that count for us.  
…That we have concerns explains that psychologically speaking we are not just the locus 
of a flow of experiences….  We can rule ourselves because certain things matter to us 
profoundly.  Therefore, authenticity is a necessary condition for sovereignty.  It is a 
necessary condition for sovereignty because 1. We can only commit ourselves 
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autonomously (sovereignty) if certain things matter to us profoundly (authenticity), and 
because 2. Authenticity gives our commitment a unique, identity conferring, content.  
Autonomy is expressive of who you are.  Being autonomous and being someone are 
tightly connected (28). 
 
Autonomy is a familiar value to the patient-centered care movement, but the importance of its 
kinship with authenticity has not always been recognized.  Understanding authenticity in this 
context illuminates what is at stake when one is inauthentic—nothing less than one’s “being 
someone.”  In the context of the doctor-patient encounter, both actors struggle with authenticity, 
and as individuals, as much is at stake for one as for the other; afterall, as this article suggests, an 
obstruction to one’s sense of authenticity threatens one’s very existence.  But with respect to the 
doctor-patient relationship, the physician’s professional role obligation to prioritize the patient’s 
wellbeing above his own places special demands on his capacity to tolerate and contain this 
struggle.  But tolerate and contain it how?  The form of this tolerance and containment is 
undefined.  Still, because of his duty to uphold his relationship with his patient, the doctor’s 
choice of definition has powerful implications, not only for himself, but also (and equally so) for 
his patient.  Exploring the nature of the doctor’s struggle with authenticity and evaluating its 
impact on patient wellbeing is the focus of the next portion of this thesis. 
 
6. The problem of authenticity 
 
However essential to the enjoyment of authenticity, ambivalence often manifests as 
conflict—opposing urges that refuse reconciliation compete for gratification.  Acknowledging 
one’s ambivalence is, therefore, often a difficult and unpleasant undertaking.  This is particularly 
so because the opposing urges that await recognition often threaten to reverse the doctor’s hard-
won positive self-concept.  Consider the common problem presented by a patient who is 
unlikable to his doctor: an alcoholic patient who, in intoxicated agitation, curses at his doctor; a 
patient who is continually re-hospitalized for problems related to medication non-compliance 
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despite his doctor’s elaborate efforts to help; a patient admitted for repair of an injury received in 
the course of wrong-doing; a patient suffering from an infection related to irresponsible behavior; 
a patient who demands receiving only a portion of a necessary treatment; a patient who is simply 
demanding, etc.  Negative feelings evoked in the course of caring for these patients are virtually 
unavoidable, but also unavoidable is the threat these feelings pose to the doctor’s sense of 
beneficence.  In the name of professionalism, the doctor may attempt to set these feelings aside, 
suppress them, and treat the patient like any other, but already one can see how his desire to be 
sensitive is threatened by his desire to become insensitive: however much he may wish to be 
permeated by the needs of his patients generally, he also wishes to resist permeation by the 
distaste he holds for this particular patient.  The doctor may feel a degree of relief in the 
organizing principle of professionalism, which by regulating his behavior promises to keep him at 
a safe distance from feeling and acting upon his distaste.  He may thus enjoy momentary safety 
from a direct encounter with urges related to the distaste that threaten his sense of commitment to 
the professional norm of beneficence.  But he also knows that negative feelings toward a 
maddening patient are inescapable and believes, moreover, that they are justified.  Feelings that 
he believes are justified on the one hand are, thus, incompatible with the claims of 
professionalism on the other.  The power of the principle of professionalism to force a certain 
form of doctorly behavior that would have the legitimacy of his feelings be too easily dismissed 
must, on some level, feel coercive.  The safety, though, that such regulated behavior grants him 
must feel like a relief.  He must feel torn, then, wondering if he has paid for his safety with his 
authenticity, wondering further if this transaction has even succeeded at protecting him from the 
penetration of these threatening feelings.  He may be unconscious of it, but his disappointment in 
the failure of the professionalism regime that he has been led to believe will protect him from the 
intensity of the feelings evoked in his work with his patients must be profound.  Understandably, 
he may wish to revoke his commitment to the norms of professionalism and strike out on his own 
to protect himself where professionalism could not: he avoids the patient he dislikes, or, when 
 26
forced to interact, he rejects the patient’s attempts to relate by inertly overriding or submitting to 
patient demands.  But doing so must evoke a feeling of betrayal, having forfeited on some level 
his commitment to the norms of professionalism.  The tension between the feelings he has and the 
feelings he wishes he had must grow, as must the gap between them.  To persist in his practice, he 
has to learn to tolerate this emerging inauthenticity and convince himself that its emergence 
ultimately serves the patient’s wellbeing; afterall, what is the alternative?  Acting on his 
destructive feelings in order to restore his sense of authenticity is unthinkable.  This is the 
problem that authenticity presents to the clinician.  While the doctor’s experience of authenticity 
ensures his lasting interest in his patient, it also forces the doctor to face a vast range of self-
states, including unpleasant and dangerous ones.  Preferring the security of positive self-states, 
the doctor may deny the existence of these other feelings, thus opening the way to inauthenticity.  
But while the efforts involved in inauthenticity promise to restrict his range of self-states to those 
he deems more acceptable, so spent, they leave him too tired and unvital to sustain his interest in 
his patient.   
As much as acting on these feelings in order to preserve authenticity—and thus his vital 
interest in his patients—is indeed undesirable, often the doctor does so despite himself, as 
illustrated in the earlier example of the resident’s decision to arrest, rather than admit, an 
assaultive, agitated patient.  Denying the existence of hostile feelings seems to work only slightly 
better than the open enactment of them.  Trapped between two bad options, doctors often become 
disaffected and deeply embattled, as do the patients who bear this outcome.  The tremendous 
effort required to persist amid these unforgiving circumstances, thus, serves neither doctor nor 
patient. 
How then can the doctor be restored to the feeling of authenticity he needs to stay with 
his patients in the midst of the tremendous and tremendously evocative ambivalence posed by 
serious illness?  One approach to an answer to this question begins with reviewing the literature 
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on negative feelings aroused in clinicians in the course of their therapeutic work, the subject of 
this next section. 
 
7. Negative countertransference: when clinicians hate their patients 
 
Pediatrician and child psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott explored these feelings in a classic 
article published in 1949, called “Hate in the Counter-Transference” (29).  The psychoanalytic 
concept of counter-transference, related to the concept of transference discussed briefly earlier, is 
a world of scholarship unto itself.  However, for the purposes of its use in this paper, the term can 
be defined as the feelings and attitudes generated in the clinician (often directed at the patient) in 
response to feelings and behaviors elaborated by the patient.  The patient’s transference 
stimulates the clinician’s counter-transference, and the interaction between the two forms of 
transference is the focus of much of the exploration that ultimately yields successful 
psychological treatment.  Indeed, one of the key contributions (30) attributed to this paper of 
Winnicott’s was the broadening of the conception of counter-transference, such that it be viewed, 
not as a barrier to treatment as it was traditionally, but as an appropriate and natural response to a 
patient’s personality that was imminently usable for the purposes of treatment.  Winnicott made 
this claim in the context of recognizing his feeling of hate for a 9 year old boy, whom he met 
during World War II in a hostel for evacuated children.  The boy struggled with problems related 
to chronic “truancy,” as Winnicott called it.  After a failed attempt to treat him at the hostel, 
Winnicott chose to bring the boy into his home for a second attempt at treatment, lasting 3 
months.  Referring to himself and his wife, he writes: 
We dealt with the first phase [of treatment] by giving him complete freedom and a 
shilling whenever he went out.  He had only to ring up and we fetched him from 
whatever police station had taken charge of him.  Soon the expected changeover 
occurred—the truancy symptom turned around, and the boy started dramatizing the 
assault on the inside….  Interpretation had to be made at any minute of day or night, and 
often the only solution in a crisis was to make the correct interpretation, as if the boy 
were in analysis.  It was the correct interpretation that he valued above everything.  The 
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important thing for the purpose of this paper is the way in which the evolution of the 
boy’s personality engendered hate in me, and what I did about it.  Did I hit him?  The 
answer is no, I never hit.  But I should have had to have done so if I had not known all 
about my hate and if I had not let him know about it too.  At crises I would take him by 
bodily strength, and without anger or blame, and put him outside the front door, whatever 
the weather or the time of day or night.  There was a special bell he could ring, and he 
knew that if he rang it he would be readmitted and no word said about the past.  He used 
this bell as soon as he had recovered from his maniacal attack.  The important thing is 
that each time, just as I put him outside the door, I told him something; I said that what 
had happened had made me hate him.  This was easy because it was so true.  I think these 
words were important from the point of view of his progress, but they were mainly 
important in enabling me to tolerate the situation without letting out, without losing my 
temper and every now and again murdering him….  This episode from ordinary life can 
be used to illustrate the general topic of hate justified in the present; this is to be 
distinguished from hate that is only justified in another setting but which is tapped by 
some action of a patient (29). 
 
There are several points worth highlighting here.  First, a statement this explicit about the hate a 
clinician feels for his patient, a feeling generally regarded as anathema to caretaking endeavors, is 
wholly uncommon and supplies a courageous, successful attempt to open discussion on how to 
achieve a deeply therapeutic outcome.  Its appearance here, as he says, is possible only because 
he knew all about his hate.  In other words, his analysis of the nature of it—that it was born of 
and applied to the present, and that it was therefore “justified”—enabled a capacity to resist the 
temptation to disown it, to understand it in its proper context, and thus to use it therapeutically.  
Second, had he not known all about his hate, he would have felt compelled, as he says, to hit the 
boy.  In other words, his hate, if it were denied, may well have been as destructive as he feared it 
to be, but made conscious not only did it cease to be destructive, but it began to become 
constructive, building his tolerance for the situation and thus his continued presence in the 
treatment.  This is the third key claim of this thesis, pertaining to why physician authenticity is so 
important: it preserves his tolerance for tremendously difficult, often painful and prolonged 
treatment.  When Winnicott writes, “This was easy because it was so true,” he attests to the 
enjoyment he felt in his acting in a way that felt ‘so true’ to himself.  He is proclaiming his 
authenticity here.  That it contributed to what many clinicians have since regarded as an 
inappropriate enactment of his hate does not diminish the significance of his authenticity enabling 
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his continued presence—and moreover, his enthusiastic interest—in the life of a child whom he 
promised to help.  This is why authenticity and the enjoyment of it that enables continued 
presence and deepened interest in a particular patient may provide a critical new focus for patient-
centered care. 
It is not surprising that Winnicott was heavily criticized for some of what he did to the 
boy in the name of therapy.  However, later clinicians made sure to rescue from the criticism the 
importance of allowing hatred to come into consciousness, not to force clinicians to recognize 
their private monstrosity, but to respect the importance of what Winnicott understood could be 
gained from it.  It helped him endure, even embrace, his promise to his patient.  Though his 
missteps were real, so too was his interest in his patient, which must have been quite a gift to a 
child so acutely sensitive to insincerity.  Winnicott believed that the clinician who tolerated the 
vast range of feelings inevitably provoked in the arduousness of even ordinary patient care would 
be less stressed by the demands placed on him by his circumstances.  He questioned the more 
traditional strategy of filtering out negative feelings in favor of positive ones, which are more 
obviously compatible with therapeutic intervention, and explored the possibility that these overtly 
positive environments actually contributed to patient harm.  As Charles Henry recently 
summarized in a piece that revisited Winnicott’s landmark article, the clinician who “remain[s] 
overly benign and seemingly unaffected by the patient's hostility might be seen by the patient as 
inauthentic and foolish.  Furthermore, being too tolerant and compassionate risks inciting envy 
about the therapist's ‘good nature’ and thereby intensifying destructive impulses” (31).  Thus, 
whatever the concerns with Winnicott’s management of his own hatred, many authors since have 
endorsed the notion he introduced, that “countertransference hate is a normal and even necessary 
aspect of working with certain patients…” (31).  This endorsement reflects, at least in part, an 
appreciation for what Winnicott, himself, admonished in his paper, “However much [the 
clinician] loves his patients he cannot avoid hating them, and fearing them, and the better he 
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knows this the less will hate and fear be the motive determining what he does to his patients” 
(30).  
Though explicitly concerned with addressing the uniquely high-pitched fears surrounding 
clinicians’ hate for their patients, Winnicott’s work also points to the importance of becoming 
concerned with clinician authenticity, generally.  Likewise, Winnicott’s work points to the harms 
of inauthenticity, as well, reflected in his concern for the environment the clinician establishes for 
the treatment of his patient.  He describes a clinician who too ardently enforces a positive 
environment in his treatment of a patient grappling with serious illness.  The “sentimental 
environment,” as he refers to this rigidly positive environment, “contains the denial of hate” and 
as such stunts one’s capacity to tolerate “the full extent of [one’s] own hate” (29).  This 
intolerance inevitably gives way to harm.  In a shocking but courageous exploration of hate’s 
existence even between intimately related interlocutors, Winnicott contends that even mother and 
baby must cope with the existence of hate and that mother must learn to tolerate it from the 
earliest moments of the baby’s life.  “[T]he mother…hates her infant from the word go,” he 
writes.  He even enumerates 18 reasons why this is so: “The baby is a danger to her body in 
pregnancy and at birth; the baby is an interference with her private life, a challenge to 
preoccupation; the baby hurts her nipples even by suckling, which is at first a chewing activity; at 
first he does not know at all what she does or what she sacrifices for him,” and so on.  The 
purpose of citing this example is to recognize how the sources of hate are often built in, 
unavoidable; nothing can change the fact that a baby is a danger to his mother’s body in 
pregnancy and at birth, nothing can make an infant understand the sacrifices his parent makes for 
him.  When Winnicott claims that the clinician cannot help but feel hate for his patient, this is the 
kind of hate he warns about denying, that he believes must be allowed into consciousness.  
Hatred, unpleasant as it may seem at first, is built in and, as Winnicott teaches, requires 
recognition such that its tremendous therapeutic potential (for doctor and patient, mother and 
baby, alike) is not lost—or worse permitted to devolve into destructive behavior.  
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Winnicott speculates that mothers tolerate their hate by episodically drawing relief from 
things like nursery rhymes, famously full of aggressive fantasy.  “Perhaps she is helped by some 
of the nursery rhymes she sings, which her baby enjoys but fortunately does not understand?  
Rockabye Baby, on the tree top, When the wind blows the cradle will rock, When the bough 
breaks the cradle will fall, Down will come baby, cradle and all.  I think of a mother (or father) 
playing with a small infant; the infant enjoying the play and not knowing that the parent is 
expressing hate in the words…” (29).  This capacity to tolerate negativity, manifest in her 
capacity to derive relief from confessing it, allows the parent to stay with the baby throughout the 
time that the baby relies on their continual presence.  Furthermore, as with his struggle to treat the 
9 year old boy, so Winnicott notes here that tolerance of negativity allows the parent to not inflict 
harm: “If, for fear of what she may do, she cannot hate appropriately when hurt by her child she 
must fall back on masochism.”  Both the continual presence and the relief of the impulse to harm 
are powerful outcomes of allowing into awareness feelings as pointedly negative as hate directed 
at people as vulnerable as a baby.  The key point here is that part of what enables beneficence—
relief in the conscious experience and careful expression of hate—hardly itself seems compatible 
with beneficence.  This is a deep and difficult claim to trust.  And trust alone is not enough.  
Ultimately, Winnicott reminds us, “…it is important to study the ways in which anxiety of 
psychotic quality and also hate are produced in those who work with severely ill psychiatric 
patients” (29).  While study may only reasonably be expected of psychiatric clinicians, the 
principle—that more than passing acknowledgement of negative feelings is required to achieve 
authenticity—holds true for non-psychiatric clinicians with patients suffering from physical 
illness, as well.  “Only in this way,” he continues, “can there be any hope of the avoidance of 
therapy that is adapted to the needs of the [clinician] rather than to the needs of the patient.”*  
                                                 
* In fact, he goes so far as to say that the clinician must admit his earlier feelings of hate for his patient before an 
analysis can be considered complete; otherwise the patient is never retrieved from the infantilized state enabled and 
utilized in the course of the analysis. 
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There are many other therapeutic uses of hate explored in the psychoanalytic literature on 
negative countertransference.  But however much distaste a particular patient’s personality or 
story may evoke in the physician, it is important to recognize that the doctor-patient encounter, all 
by itself, is equally evocative: the very fact of the patient’s neediness, the expectation he has for 
energetic doctoring, the intrusiveness of even reasonable demands.  Even more deeply evocative 
are the many realities that attenuate patient gratitude: that the doctor might not cure him, that 
material mistakes may be made, that he must make his way through his illness in the company of 
a clinician whose health is a constant reminder of his tragic and tragically lonely fate.  Each of 
these claims is built in to every doctor-patient encounter, even those with a healthy or recovering 
patient.  The arousal of distaste, given the force of these claims, is also inevitable.  But the ethos 
of suppression, however often it fails both doctor and patient, is strong.  It is easy to imagine a 
well-intentioned physician springing to work to ease the pains just enumerated, recasting them in 
a more positive light: as a privilege, for example, to be entrusted with his patient’s care.  But this 
is the ‘sentimental environment’ that Winnicott warned is so dangerous.  It is also easy to imagine 
a physician who has become tired with how unending this work is, how insatiable patients seem 
to be, irrespective of his efforts.  Pursuing the heroic standards of professionalism, often 
reinforced by the wish for heroics issued by their patients, doctors often set out on the impossible 
task of salving pains that ultimately cannot be salved.  As long as human beings occupy the role 
of physician, for example, mistakes will be made.  While mechanizing medicine may address the 
number of mistakes made and thus make a valuable contribution, it will do nothing to protect 
patients from the anxiety underlying their demand for fewer mistakes.  Ultimately, it is not human 
fallibility but human frailty that worries patients so profoundly: one little mistake and their frailty 
manifests in a way that is often terrifying.  Indeed, these inescapable realities are as frightening to 
doctors as they are to patients, and their interest in distracting themselves from them is often 
equally intense.  This is the trigger to doctor inauthenticity that distorts the doctor’s relationship 
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with himself, threatens his sense of professional commitment, and eventually even threatens to 
harm his patients.  
The construction of inert environments often results from the doctor’s pursuit of safety 
from the turmoil of disease intervention.  But in his article, Hatred and Its Rewards, 
psychoanalyst Glen Gabbard notes another reason why a clinician might seek to provide a 
‘sentimental environment,’ in which the clinician appears easy and unaffected by the patient’s 
turmoil (32).  In establishing such an environment, he hypothesizes, the clinician may be 
interested in serving his unconscious sadism—his wish to harm, as Anna Freud might say—
delivered in the intensification of shame and self-criticism that the environment produces in the 
patient, whose emotional impotence is thus laid bare.  Thus, such environments may reflect either 
doctors’ fear and flight or anger and aggression, both stemming from an anxious need to 
overcome the claims of negative feeling-states.  In a powerful passage referring to his patients, 
Gabbard speculates about the uses of hate feelings in a way that seems equally descriptive of 
what many doctors experience.  
I have often wondered why these patients cling so tenaciously to hated internal objects 
and hating self-representations when their lives are eaten up with bitterness. Their sense 
of being wronged is so pervasive that forgiveness is out of the question.  When one 
analyzes these patients for long periods of time, one learns that a hateful relationship is 
better than none at all.  …As [other authors have] also noted, the patient's identity may be 
organized around hatred, and the modification of the hating self-representation or of the 
hated object representation is often experienced as a form of annihilation. The patient 
may preserve a sense of meaning by hating, and change may cause the patient to confront 
a sense of living in a meaningless state. As psychoanalysts, we too often underestimate 
the importance of existential issues such as having a reason to live (32). 
 
It may sound extreme, but if ‘doctor’ were substituted for each mention of ‘patient’ in this 
passage, something true comes through, something that physicians easily sense in one another 
and that many patients sense in physicians, as well.  For many doctors, ‘their sense of being 
wronged’ comes from their sense that their role as professional has failed to protect them from 
unwanted self-states.  And, as injuries attributable to the inadequacies of the professional role 
accumulate, many doctors do indeed develop an ‘identity organized around hate,’ in one form or 
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another.  However unconfessed, many physicians recoil with the need to attend to another 
hospital admission.  This resistant posture can and often does become a fixed part of the 
physician’s identity.  Thus, feeling wronged by but beholden to the norms of professionalism and 
unconvinced that his feelings towards his patients need as much editing as professionalism 
demands, doctors often become hardened victims of their own sense of betrayal—betrayal of their 
authenticity in deference to their unsteady commitment to professionalism and betrayal of their 
loyalty to professionalism in pursuit of restored authenticity.  Ultimately, however, the flight from 
this troubled psychological territory to the relative peace of fixed attitudinal states, as Gabbard 
suggests, often yields anything but this much-wished-for peace.  Instead, it often animates in the 
doctor new and deeper forms of distress: a sense of feelinglessness, loss of feeling alive, 
meaninglessness, and eventually even the loss of ‘a reason to live’ in the lives of his patients.  
 
8. The preference for false conflict and a way through it 
 
 What then should be done? If the premise is accepted that patients depend on and deserve 
optimal physician functioning and that inauthenticity threatens physicians’ ability to function 
optimally, then the question is how to restore doctors’ sense of authenticity when that authenticity 
contains the normal range of human feelings, including many that seem to threaten patient care.   
 In answer to this question, this thesis suggests that these feelings, far from requiring 
suppression, need to have a role in the care of the patients they are thought to threaten, if the 
doctors who have them are to be restored to themselves.  The nature of that role may be best 
understood in the context of an example: consider an elderly patient who has recently suffered a 
massive stroke and who has entered a coma.  The healthcare team determines that interventions 
are medically futile.  Because the patient is unable to issue demands himself, and because in this 
case the patient has no prior documentation of his wishes, the demands of the patient’s family 
will stand in for those of the patient.  Soon after the physician has shared with the family the 
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patient’s bleak prognosis, the patient develops an infection, and the family requests its treatment.  
The physician sympathizes with the family’s pain, but he also feels obligated to protect the 
patient from the potential harm of futile treatment. 
 The traditional debate around medical futility has explored from a number of perspectives 
the doctor’s obligation to treat this patient.  From one perspective, the obligation hinges on the 
definition of medical futility.  Lawrence J. Schneiderman et. al. argued that a physician could 
reasonably deem a form of treatment futile if that treatment indeed proved futile in the last 100 
similar cases, gathered from personal experience, colleagues’ experience, and experiences 
reported in the literature (33).  From this perspective, if the doctor deems that the treatment is 
futile, then he has no obligation to supply it.   
 Another perspective on this question suspends the task of defining medical futility and 
instead seeks consensus among clinicians pertaining to a level of suspicion that could justify 
pronouncing a particular treatment futile (34).  From this perspective, if the doctor feels a certain 
threshold of suspicion has been met that treatment is futile, then he is justified in denying the 
family’s request.  
A third perspective on this question hinges on the priority assigned to relevant 
professional principles.  Some have argued that physician autonomy is the key principle at stake, 
warning that even principled deference to the patient’s right to self-determination risks dissolving 
the physician’s moral agency.  Others have countered that the principle of patient self-
determination is most important, stating that whatever their interest in professional autonomy, 
doctors’ ultimate professional duty is to subordinate their own interests to those of their patients.  
In this case, if the doctor prioritizes physician autonomy over other relevant principles and he 
believes that his patient’s interests are not well served by delivering treatment, then again he is 
justified in withholding it.  
From each of these perspectives it would seem that the doctor is justified in not treating 
the patient, despite the family’s plea.  The question of the doctor’s obligation has been 
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answered—but does the situation really feel resolved?  The plea still stands, and something inside 
the doctor feels wrong ignoring its force.  Should the doctor maintain his conclusion not to treat 
and ignore his misgivings?  Or should he allow his sympathy for the family to override his sense 
that further treatment may harm the patient?  What should he do to respond to these competing 
claims?  Invoking the principles of professionalism gives no good answer here.  Under the 
pressure of his patient’s looming death and the family’s growing anguish, the doctor feels deeply 
torn, overwhelmed by the urgency of the opposing claims and abandoned by the promise of the 
professional role to protect him.  He anxiously seeks protection from another source and 
considers a battery of options that he knows, on some level, are inadequate: to just do what the 
family requests, or hold fast to his decision to withhold treatment and ignore the family’s request, 
to avoid contact with the family while doing so, to avoid contact with his colleagues who might 
judge him for his stance, etc.  It is plausible that he might even feel quite resentful here, thinking, 
‘I hate having to choose between two things that I think are equally important.  Either way I 
choose, I’m wrong.  Either way, I end up the bad guy.  I hate being put in this position, and I hate 
them all for putting me in it.’  But what is his alternative to acting on these obvious breaches of 
professional norms, when professional norms have failed to fulfill the promise he believed they 
made to him?  Then again, if he indulges these breaches, what standing will he have with his 
sense of professional commitment?  Who will he have become?  Self-estrangement seems to be 
the only certain outcome. 
This is the key moment, when inauthenticity can overtake authenticity.  But what if the 
doctor paused here, and so paused, what if he recognized the disorientation reflected in his 
anxious consideration of equally undesirable options—protecting the patient but ignoring the 
family, or taking mercy on the family and putting a critically ill patient at further risk.  He may 
have previously looked at such decisions and thought, ‘These are the difficult decisions that one 
must face in medicine.  And it’s what makes medicine so special.’  But this is the sentimental 
environment that ‘contains the denial of hate’ that Winnicott warned about.  If, instead, he let his 
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sense crystallize that ‘something still feels wrong,’ even after the algorithm has been processed 
and the decision has been made, maybe he would realize that it is not a difficult decision that he 
faces, but a fake one, between two wrong answers.  What is difficult is confronting what drives 
the production of a fake decision: the awful truth that whether or not the patient’s infection is 
treated, an unnegotiated, unnegotiable loss will happen, and that the pain in the family’s request is 
cannot be salved.  There is an injury in recognizing this truth, and it hurts everyone who feels 
involved in the decision.  If he suppresses the acknowledgment of this injury, it will have the 
chance to deepen, and as similar injuries from similar encounters accumulate, it will likely give 
way, as chronic injuries do, to a loss of function.  But maybe the doctor would feel some relief in 
letting the truth come in, in recognizing that his unedited reactions, such as his quiet sense that 
something still feels wrong, can actually be useful, not threatening.  These reactions can point to 
important discoveries about the real problem (i.e., how to live with unchangeable and awful 
truths) that underlies the stated one (i.e., to treat or not to treat).  In other words, not only would 
his reactions not require immediate processing by the clumsy hands of professionalism, but they 
could come forward, take shape, and become altogether important in the guidance they could 
provide.  This would bring the doctor back into himself, to rediscover his easily exiled sense of 
authenticity.   
But what would this rediscovery really accomplish?  What is the significance of the 
restoration of physician authenticity, beyond the obvious significance that it holds for the 
physician?  This thesis contends that many important consequences follow.  It starts with the 
opening of the possibility that the doctor might feel less isolated from himself and others, and 
thus less reluctant to present concerns to his colleagues and seek their counsel.  More supported 
and richer for the counsel, maybe the doctor would feel more interested in and more capable of 
opening up difficult discussions with his patient or patient’s family.  Many other questions will 
certainly arise in the course of these difficult discussions, but maybe so self-possessed, he would 
be less likely to become ensnared in conflicts composed of false constructs, such as choosing 
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which arbitrary standard for medical futility to apply—a certain degree of statistical remoteness 
for recovery, medical community consensus on a standard, or moral hierarchy imposed upon 
equally important principles.  When he is trapped in the feeling of having lost his bearings, when 
he has lost himself to inauthenticity, this is exactly what happens—he seeks an algorithm that will 
regulate his behavior, organize his thoughts, and relieve him of the burden of figuring out how to 
respond to the agony that lies in the family’s request to treat a patient who has no chance of 
recovery; so guided, he can withhold treatment and reject the family’s desperate request, 
comforted that the source of the rejection is an external algorithm.  Restored to authenticity, 
though, his uneasiness about the adequacy of this logic could blossom and an interest in directing 
his attentions to a more honest assessment of the problem could evolve. 
Thus, while the doctor’s restoration to a sense of authenticity clearly benefits the doctor 
before it benefits anyone else, it later benefits everyone else, the patient and the patient’s family, 
and it does so in a way that almost no other medical act can.  It secures the doctor’s presence, 
interest, and best judgment, and thus safeguards his patient from abandonment, indifference and 
misguidance.  There is, of course, no guaranteed outcome to a doctor-patient relationship 
premised on restored physician authenticity.  But so restored, other lost truths can be 
rediscovered, as well—such as the total inadequacy of the proposed standards for medical futility 
or the existence of equally important principles of professionalism that cannot simultaneously be 
honored and the unacceptability of the requirement to sacrifice one if either is to be fulfilled.  It is 
possible that this rediscovery will encourage compromise, at least from the doctor, where 
previously none seemed available; the choice was presented as either-or and the principles 
reflected in each were incompatible.  But once the doctor admits to himself how forced it feels to 
prioritize one principle over another, their moral equality can be recognized.  With this 
recognition, the opportunity for compromise is revealed, as is the realization that refusing to 
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compromise suggests a moral hierarchy where there is none.* Thus, the question whether or not to 
treat a dying patient whose family begs for treatment, need not be answered by a deeply divided 
doctor whose misgivings persist with either choice and whose capacity to make such a choice 
requires a flight to an inauthentic self that leaves the patient and his family out of the decision; 
rather, the question can be opened into a discussion aimed at tearing down the false premise of 
the conflict, building the good faith that comes from authentic engagement, and discovering a 
mutually agreeable compromise. 
This rereading of how to approach the question of medically futile treatment requested by 
a desperate family illuminates the relevance of Winnicott’s sense of countertransference.  The 
doctor, in this case, may feel squeezed by the choice of two terrible options, one exploiting the 
patient’s vulnerability, the other exploiting that of the family.  If the doctor is already estranged 
from himself (i.e., operating inauthentically) when he reads this choice, he will be unable to see 
its false premise.  The anger he might feel at what he knows will be the implication of his 
choice—that he chose wrong, no matter which option he decided upon—is imminently 
understandable.  To the extent that his anxiety about this implication is unrecognized, though, it 
triggers an almost instantaneous flight from self.  Thus, the tremendous benefits of recognizing 
one’s hate toward one’s patient or patient’s family, which Winnicott regarded as essential to 
appropriate patient care, is quickly hidden from the doctor’s view behind the inauthentic claims 
he uses to protect himself (e.g., ‘The family was being unreasonable, so I feel good about the 
difficult decision I made to protect the patient,’ or ‘I didn’t want to be the one to take the family’s 
hope away, so I treated the patient and let nature take its course,’ etc.).  So lost to himself, the 
danger that Winnicott identified in 1949 is realized: the treatment plan the doctor pursues now 
aims at self-protection, not patient care.  This is the loss of patient-centeredness wrought by 
physician inauthenticity.  And this is also why even non-psychiatric doctors must beware of 
                                                 
*A closely related and more elaborate discussion of the appropriate approach to such conflicts can be explored in Burt, 
R.A. 2002. The medical futility debate: patient choice, physician obligation, and end-of-life care. J Palliat Med 5:249-
254.  
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negative countertransference: its denial violates their authenticity and advances self-protection 
instead of patient-care.  
 There are important benefits to this approach to the turmoil inherent in the care of 
patients, but believing in these benefits does not make the work of the approach easy.  The 
importance of the work, though, can be seen from what happens to doctors when they avoid it: 
they feel lost in the challenges they often face and, when disabled by this feeling, they begin to 
become lost to themselves.  Over time, this process yields in the physician a feeling of being 
uninvested, despite his professional aims.  The collateral harms of operating outside of oneself, 
the harms of one’s inauthenticity, accumulate, and the sense of having somehow disappointed 
oneself gives way cynicism.  Doctors need to be protected from these harms if they are to be able 
to survive the turmoil of patient care and stay invested in their patients who need them.  This is 
what patient-centered care requires.  In the earlier portions of this paper, we saw how the patient-
centered care movement has preferred to pursue patient-satisfaction as the measure of patient-
centeredness.  But however outwardly well-matched these variables seem to be, beneath the 
surface their profound and dangerous mismatch is apparent.  The goal of patient-centered 
medicine is not a satisfied patient who is blind to the basis of his/her satisfaction.  Neither is the 
goal to replace the exaggerated moral authority of physicians with that of patients.  But this is 
where the pursuit of patient-satisfaction leads.  It is the wrong paradigm for patient-centered care.  
Its casualties are the doctors who hide in it and the patients who rely on the care they issue from 
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